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Dependency in Workmen's Compensation:
Letting the Expectations and Conduct of
Affected Parties Play A More Significant
Role
Clifford Davis*
In determining which persons are entitled to receive workmen's
compensation death benefits, Professor Davis argues that support
should be provided for all survivors who might reasonably have
expected to receive support had the workman not suffered an
accidental death. Although special rules are proposedfor particular
problems such as common law wives, non-legal wives, adopted
children, stepchildren, and legitimacy, the author concludes that the
general rule must be a simple one-statutes should provide for the
payment of death benefits to "dependents"--to permit a flexible
interpretation in individual cases. Such a reference to the acts and
expectations of affected parties most accurately reflects the purpose
of death benefits to substitute for the financial support that a
workman gave others in his lifetime.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Workmen's compensation death benefits are a substitute for the
financial support that a worker gave others in his lifetime. Ideally they
should fully replace for all survivors what a deceased worker could
have been expected to have provided but for his occupational death. The
most humanitarian and principled guide for the provision of such death
benefits is to look to how a deceased employee spent the money earned
during his lifetime and to what his survivors might reasonably have
expected him to provide them. Such a reference to the acts and
expectations of affected parties most accurately reflects the purpose of
workman's compensation which is to shift the cost of work-connected
death from those who received and expected to receive support from
the employee to the employing industry and its customers. Anything
less than such treatment would mean that some dependant survivors of
a worker whose death was the result of an occupational accident would
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa; Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Connecticut. B.S. 1949, University of Chicago; LL.B. 1952, Harvard University.
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bear losses that are not visited upon similarly situated dependants of
workers who avoid death.
The death benefits provided by compensation legislation must
satisfy two tests. First, the benefits should cover the net economic loss
resulting from occupational death.' Second, those survivors who could
have expected to benefit from future earnings ought to share
appropriately in the sum total of the benefits provided. This article
focuses primarily upon this second question. The inadequacy of
available benefits, however, may require the exclusion as beneficiaries
of some survivors with expectations of support in order more
adequately to provide for others. Thus, inadequacy of total benefits will
be considered when it is relevant to the determination of who is entitled
to receive benefits. To the extent that present laws fail to include all
survivors with reasonable expectation of support and fail to provide
fully adequate compensation for net economic losses, there is need for
reform in the provision of death benefits.
Any desire for a more sophisticated system of settlements that
recognizes significant situational distinctions, and tailors treatment by
reference to how deceased workmen spent their earnings conflicts with
the desire to simplify the administration of benefits by incorporating
and using domestic relations rules to identify those survivors entitled
to death benefits, and the desire for efficiency, achieved through
seemingly simple and uniform arrangements. This is a basic conflict in
compensation law.2 This article, however, is premised on the belief that
the principles of compensation would be better served by reference to
what the worker did and what the survivors could have expected had
the worker lived. For example, in the case of the spousal claimant, such
a reference would be preferable to the incorporation of the ceremonial
and recording requirements necessary to establish a legal marriage
under domestic relations rules or the fault oriented rules that regulate
the dissolution of marriages. Although statutory ambiguity allows
administrators and courts to recognize the importance of the conduct
I. One study which explored the failure of compensation legislation to cover the economic
losses resulting from employment death asks four questions: (I) how long would the worker have
worked had the accident not occurred; (2) what would have been his gross earnings during this
period; (3) what is the present value of these future earnings; and (4) how much of this earnings

loss is a net loss to survivors. E. CHEIT.

INJURY AND RECOVERY IN THE COURSI' OF L.MPLOY\IIFNT

66-84 (1961). Based upon a careful examination of the answers to these questions, and upon a
comparison of the benefits available under compensation statutes, the study concluded that death
benefits in 36 of 51 jurisdictions replaced less than 201T of net economic losses. Id. at 109.
2. See F. CHIET. supra note I, at 249; c. Horovitz. The Meaning ol "'Diabilitt"Under
Workmen's Compensation Acts, I NACCA L.J. 32 (1948).
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and the expectations of the parties by stretching customary domestic
relations rules, a more flexible statutory treatment of dependents is
3
certainly a preferable solution.
II.

A

REVIEW OF THE DEPENDENCY STATUTES

In defining the class of persons entitled to receive workmen's
compensation death benefits, some statutes simply allocate benefits to
deceased workmen's "dependents," that is, those persons who are able
to prove dependency in fact.4 Such a broad classification allows the
decision-making body to allocate benefits with maximum reference to
a deceased worker's previous and projected spending patterns.
A great number of statutes, however, provide more restrictive methods

for determining eligibility for death benefits. These methods, in some
cases, supplement or replace the test of dependency in fact. On the

one hand, there are statutory presumptions created for the benefit of
certain classes of claimants which eliminate the need for a member of
the class to prove actual dependency. On the other hand, some statutes
restrict claimants to those members of a certain predefined class who
can prove actual dependency and exclude all other persons who are not

members of the class, even if such persons could prove dependency in
fact.
.4.

Presumptionsof. Dependency

Wives and minor children are probably the two classes o-f
survivors that a deceased workman was most likely to have lived with,

actually supported, or been obligated to support. On the basis of this
substantial probability, most statutes create a presumption of
3. Although the Council of State Governments has recognized the need for legislative
change, its 1963 proposal relies upon the traditional approach, using domestic relations rules
to provide benefits for the widow, children, parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents and
grandchildren. COUNCIl. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS. SUGGESTED STATI LEGISLATION PROGRAM
I oR 1963, at 130. 160. The objections to this restrictive arrangement should be obvious. See infra.
Senators Javits and Yarborough are now seeking a national commission to evaluate the
adequacy of state compensation laws, and it is hoped that such a commission, if established,
would examine the adequacy of death benefits. See Javits, National (nntissio,
to 1mprove,
florkinen's ('onpensation, 4 TRIAL. Oct.-Nov., 1968, at 44.
4
. See. e.g.. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36 (1964 Replacement Vol.). See Wright Constr.
Co. v. Brannan, 217 Md. 397, 142 A.2d 574 (1958), which reversed an award for a child whose
father had not made support payments for 20 months before his occupational death. The opinion
of the court and the dissent discuss the father's obligation to support his child, which alone is
not sufficient to entitle the child to" death benefits, and the relation of the obligation to support
to the probability of his giving support which would entitle a claimant to death benefits under a
test which looks solely to dependency. See also KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5l0b (Supp. 1968).
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dependency for widows and children. This usually means that although
other claimants are required to prove dependency, the widow and
children are entitled to benefits on proof of status only.5 Such statutory
presumptions may be absolute or conditioned upon the widow or child
having lived with the workman at the time of his death.6
Two policies seem to underlie the use of the absolute or
conditional presumption. First, the presumption probably reflects a
legislative assumption about how the workman should have spent his
earnings. The absolute presumption deems the money to be so spent,
while the conditional presumption tries to blend both what was in fact
done with the notion of what ought to have been done. Second, the
creation of a presumption of dependency in favor of widows and
children may be intended to simplify the administration of death
benefits. One result of simplification by the use of presumptions of
dependency is that benefits for all members of a given class are the
same standardized sum per week for the same fixed number of weeks.7
The administration of benefits is often further simplified by providing
the widow and children with priority over all other dependents so that
the surviving widow or child automatically excludes all otherwise
eligible claimants.
Simplification of the administration of death benefits through the
use of presumptions may produce, however, a windfall to a survivor who
would have received nothing had the workman lived, and defeat the
expectation of others who would have received support from the
deceased workman. For example, a woman was awarded death benefits
as the surviving widow although she lived apart from her husband and
bore five illegitimate children by five separate fathers.' Also, awarding
benefits to the "legal" widow only has required the exclusion of a
5.

N.Y. WORK.MEN'S CoMP. LAW § 16(l)(a) (legal wife entitled to benefits except when she

has abandoned husband and such separation is sufficient to obtain judgment of separation under
domestic relations law); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (1967) (but legal wife may
be excluded if separated for three years).
6. Representative of the many statutes granting presumptions of dependency to the widow
and children living with the worker at the time of his death are: CAL. LABOR CODE § 35011 IND.
ANN. STAT. § 40-1403a (1965 Replacement Vol.); N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-13(0 (Supp. 1968).
7. See 3 A. LARSON. vORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, table 15, at 548-50 (1968).
8. Gibbons v. Maryland Gas Co., 114 Ga. App. 788, 152 S.E.2d 815 (1966). Set, also Sims
v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 59 Ga. App. 170, 200 S.E. 164 (1938) (compensation awarded
a legal wife even though she entered into a bigamous marriage with another man), Immorality
of the claimant, however, plays a more important role when the claimant is not the legal wife
but knows of an existing prior marriage and, despite that knowledge, continues to live with a
worker until his death. Insurance Co. of North America v. Jewel, 118 Ga. App, 599, 164 S.E.2d
846 (1968).
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second wife living with the workman at the time of his death, when the

first wife, after the workman's death, invalidated the worker's divorce
from her.'
B.

Exclusion of Dependents

In addition to granting a presumption of dependency, either
conditional or absolute, many statutes limit eligibility to certain classes
of persons, such as the widow, widower, child, grandchild, parent,
grandparent, brother, sister, 0 or to the members of the decedent's
"family."" The effect of such "list" statutes is the exclusion of some
survivors who were actually dependent on the deceased workman, but
who cannot fit themselves within the terms of the limitations.12 Thus,
to the extent that such statutes exclude persons actually dependent on
the deceased worker, they would appear inconsistent with the statutory
intent to remove the burdens of accidental death from actual
dependents and impose the costs of occupational death upon the
employing industry and the consumers of its goods and services.
Death benefits may be further limited by excluding those survivors
capable of supporting themselves even though they may have in fact
enjoyed benefits from the deceased worker's earnings during his
lifetime. This limitation is generally applicable only to children who
have attained a specified age, and to widowers who are denied benefits
on the death of a working wife unless the widower is incapable of
supporting himself.' 3 If widows, however, are automatically entitled to
9. See Harmes v. Industrial Comm'n, 40 III. 2d 488, 240 N.E.2d 674 (1968). Alternate
solutions to the problem of the bigamous claimant would be to focus upon actual dependency
and not the legal relationship, Kendall v. Housing Authority, 196 Md. 370, 76 A.2d 767 (1950),
or to split the available benefits among the wives, Ritchie v. Katy Coal Co., 313 Ky. 310, 231
S.W.2d 57 (1950).
10. E.g.. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3503 includes aunt, uncle, brother-in-law, sister-in-law,
nephew, and niece as well as spouse, child, stepchild, parent, and brother and sister; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 2330(a) (1953) (widow, widower, children, father, mother, brothers, and sisters).
II. Eg., Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.075(3) (1962) combines the membership or living in the
household requirement with the list by providing: "'No person shall be considered a dependent in
any degree unless he is living in the household of the employee at the time of the accident, or
unless such a person bears to the employee the relation of father, mother, husband, or wife, fatherin-law or mother-in-law, grandfather or grandmother, child or grandchild, or brother or sister of
the whole or half blood."
12. See Knoxville Gray Eagle Marble Co. v. Meek, 159 Tenn. 577, 21 S.W.2d 625 (1929),
Consolidated Underwriters v. Ward, 57 S.W,2d 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). But see Peay v. Fred
Kulow & Co., 226 Mich. 512, 197 N.W. 1020 (1924) (aunt entitled to benefits as member of the
deceased's family). But the mother-in-law may be able to bring herself within the class entitled
to benefits where the statute provides for members of the decedent's family. Archibald v.
Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 202 La. 89, II So. 2d 492 (1942).
13. Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.075(b) (1962) (incapacitated husband who has not abandoned
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death benefits under a statutory presumption of dependency, it would
seem that widowers, whose wives suffer a work-connected death, should
enjoy similar treatment. Indeed, there may be a constitutional
argument for equal treatment of surviving spouses whether the worker
was a man or a woman. For example, a recent decision of a federal

district court in Illinois extended to the wife the benefits of an Indiana
law which allowed a husband to recover for loss of consortium for
negligent injury to his wife, but did not allow the wife to sue for loss
of consortium because of negligent injury to her husband. The statute,
according to the court, discriminated unreasonably and arbitrarily
against women, and its failure to provide corresponding rights for men
and women violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment." In any event, a differential treatment of widow and
widower is inconsistent with the general principle of compensation law
that losses caused by occupational death should fall on employers and
those who consume the employer's goods and services.",
III.

THE DEPENDENT SPOUSE: EXCLUDING THE TRULY MERETRICIOUS
RELATIONSHIP

A.

Benefits jbr the Widow

Most compensation acts provide roughly uniform death benefits
for all dependent widows. This uniformity within each state is due, in
part, to the general presumption of dependency which entitles a widow
to benefits without any showing of actual dependency, as well as to the
leveling of benefits produced by statutory limitations providing low
dollar maximums on weekly payments and arbitrary limits on the
wife entitled to benefits); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 634 (1959) (widower entitled "only if
incapable of self-support and actually dependent wholly or partially . . . at the time or . .
injury"). But contrast R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-33-13(b) (1968), which gives a conclusive
presumption to a "husband upon a wife with whom he lives or upon whom he is dependent at
the time of her death." Cataldo v. Admiral Inn, Inc., 227 A.2d 199 (R.I. 1967) read the
presumption as giving the husband who lives with the wife at the time of her occupational death
a right to benefits and upheld it against a constitutional challenge.
14. Karezewski v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
15. The alternate theory of compensation, that of "least social cost," requires that
"distribution of unavoidable losses . . . which imposes the least hardship upon individuals and
results in the smallest diminution of the community's economic assets." E. DOWNEY. WORKNILN'S
COMPENSATION 9 (1924). If this alternate theory were followed to justify the denial of benefits to
widowers except when they are incapable of supporting themselves, then no reason exists to give
widows a presumption of dependency. Equality could be achieved for widows and widowers by
making dependency a condition of all death benefits, not just the widower's benefits. Such equality
might well result in most widows receiving benefits while no more widowers become entitled to
benefits.
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number of total payments." Although this practice of treating all
widows alike, regardless of age or other factors, provides an apparent
equality, the practice is actually unfair and inequitable.
There is ample evidence that a woman widowed at age 46 is far
less likely to remarry or otherwise overcome the adverse effect of her
husband's death than the woman widowed at age 25.17 Similarly, the
woman widowed at age 42 will exhaust her 300 or'400 weeks of
compensation benefits long before she becomes entitled to old age or
retirement benefits, while the 55-year-old widow may well continue to
receive her payments when she becomes eligible for old age payments.
Despite such real differences in need at different ages, however, only
nine states provide tailored treatment in the form of true annuities. 8
Most statutes provide benefits only for a limited period, and terminate
the widow's rights upon remarriage. 9
It is easy to justify the termination of a widow's benefits upon her
remarriage on the grounds that she is no longer dependent." This
insistance upon dependency as the controlling principle, however, is
ironically overlooked by statutes which limit death benefits to a fixed
number of weekly payments. If the termination of dependency because
of remarriage within the statutory period allowable for payment of
benefits is recognized, dependency that continues beyond the arbitrary
statutory maximum period should also be recognized and adequately
compensated.
As a program for replacement of earnings and support lost by
occupational death, the system of weekly payments of death benefits
is a tailored treatment, and in this respect, periodic payments have an
advantage over a system of lump sum payments, although there is
evidence that lump sums have been well used when they have been
paid. 2 ' On the other hand, the fear of excessive claims appears to put
limits on the payment of adequate benefits in cases where greatest
16. See A. LARSON. supra note 7, table 15, at 548-49.
17. E. CHErT. supra note 1, at 128-29.
18. Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
Washington, and West Virginia. The Longshoremen's Act and the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act provide true annuities. 3 A. LARSON. supra note 7, table 15.
19. Id.
20. The saving effected for the compensation carrier by a widow's remarriage is
acknowledged in some states by a lump sum settlement, or incentive payment., for the widow who
remarries. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1315(d) (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-13(1) (Supp. 1968).
21. E. CHEaI. supra note 1, at 276, citing a California survey indicating that injured workers
who chose lump sums with a plan for the use of the lump sum had reported overwhelmingly that
the plan was successfully carried out. For other comments on lump sum settlement, see H. & A.
Somers, Workmen's COMIPENSATION 161 (1954).
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hardship is shown; that is, where dependency outlasts the maximum
statutory period. It is possible to draw an analogy to the conflict over

limitations on the allowed dollar amount of payments for medical
treatment. Despite an avowed purpose to give full medical treatment

to all persons disabled by their occupations, several statutes have put
dollar limits on the amount of medical treatment that must be
provided.22 Although some success has been achieved in removing these
limits,23 or in raising the dollar amounts,24 there can never be a true
tailoring of benefits to actual losses when there are dollar limits on

available medical benefits, or when a widow is entitled to receive
benefits for only a fixed period or a lump sum settlement.

One way to answer the fears that the cost of adequate benefits for
widows will be excessive is to suggest that the annuities paid to

unremarried widows be cut off when the widow becomes eligible for old
age or survivor's benefits under social security. This approach would
be premised on the reasonable assumption that the social security

program should have primary responsibility for the relief of the loss
of income during the retirement years, 25 while compensation benefits

should cover wage earning losses during occupational years.2" Another
proposal would be to provide a minimum of 300 weeks of benefits for
all widows, but allow those widows who were married for a longer
period of time to receive benefits for a period proportioned to the
length of the widow's total married life, not to run past age 62 or 65.

The prospects for legislative changes are not promising. Fatal
accidents comprise less than one percent of the total of all

compensation claims, 2 7 and a good portion of those claimants are
22. 3 A. LARSON, supra note 7, table 13, at 542, shows 15 states have limits upon medical
benefits.
23. The table cited in note 22 supra shows that Iowa limits benefits to $3,000. The limit in
Iowa, however, has been raised to $7,500, IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.27 (Supp. 1969); and it is
possible to obtain additional sums upon application to the Industrial Commissioner,
24. The tiend toward full medical benefits is fully discussed in E. CIEIT. supra note I, at
37-38 (1961). This author has prepared estimates of the cost of removing dollar limits on medical
benefits for those states which have such limits (Id., table 2.5, at 44-45) as well as a formula for
the calculation of such costs, all of which should interest anyone who wishes to see such
limitations removed from compensation legislation.
25. The trend to increase coverage of death and disability under social security has
increased the overlap with workmen's compensation coverage. See J. POLLACK, DISABILITY UNDER
SOCIAL SECURITY IN OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (E. Cheit & M. Gordon eds.
1963).
26. The reasons for maintaining a compensation system separate from broader systems of

social insurance are discussed in W.
27.

BEVERIDGE. SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES

(1942).

The proportion of fatal accidents to all accidents is indicated by the 1968-69 MINN.
WORKMEN'S Co.ip BIENNIAL REP. 26, which has a table indicating only 251 fatal accidents out
of a total of 64,46W5accidents in the year ended June 30, 1968.
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dependents who eventually remarry or otherwise adjust. Relief initiated
by the courts seems equally unlikely. Although our legal system goes
to great lengths to assure that legislatures and administrators, do not
force those who are alike into separate catagories that are given
different treatment, there is no similar judicial guarantee, other than
the vague principle of "due process of law,2s that legislatures will not
create classifications that ignore differences in age, length of marital
relationship and other relevant characteristics. Realistically, however,
a system of classification which treats unequals alike is as potentially
unreasonable as the unequal treatment of equals. Someday, perhaps, a
judical remedy may be fashioned.
B.

Defining the Spousal Relationship

1. Legal Wives.-Statutes that provide death benefits for the
widow have been interpreted by the courts to mean a legal widow
only. 91 Relief from this rigid rule, however, may -be obtained in some
cases if the woman claiming benefits as a widow offers proof of her
marriage to the deceased workman. This evidence would shift, to the
employer or the compensation carrier, the burden of proving that there
was an impediment to the marriage or that the marriage had been
3
dissolved.
One important effect of an insistence upon providing benefits for
the legal widow only is the exclusion of the divorced spouse. Although
such a person is entitled, under a court order, to a portion of the
workman's earnings, the loss of support she suffers on the workman's
death, would not be replaced by compensation death benefits.31 There
are probably two reasons for excluding the ex-spouse from eligibility
for death benefits: (1) to provide more adequate benefits for the wife
living with the worker at the time of his death, and (2) a general
hostility to divorcees. This treatment of the divorced spouse, however,
is irrational to the extent that it provides a general rule to be applied
without regard to the actual dependency. It works to deny benefits to
28. See Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 101 Utah 12, 116 P.2d 771
(1941), which recognized a possible constitutional objection to a disproportionate treatment of
beneficiaries but upheld a Utah statute construed to give a sole minor survivor the same benefits
accorded an adult dependent with one minor.
29. Woods v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 141 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), and cases
cited in note 8 supra.
30. Parker v. American Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 181, 56 S.E.2d 214 (1949); Comment,
Presumption of Validity of Second Marriageto Allow Beneficiary to Recover, 6 BAYLOR L. REv.

242 (1954).
3 1. Arey v. Viscose Corp. of Va., 19 OPINIONS OF THE INDUS. COMM'N OF VA. 133.
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survivors, who may have been innocent parties in the divorce
proceedings, when-the spouse obligated to make the support payments
happens to be the victim of a fatal occupational accident. In balancing
the claims of the divorced spouse against those of the employer and
those of competing claimants, the principle that compensation benefits
should replace the support that lost earnings would have provided
dictates that the expectations of the former spouse should be
recognized.
Among statutes which do not require that the widow be living with
the workman at the time of his death in order for her to be entitled to
benefits, many provide that the rights of the legal wife will be barred
if she has deserted or abandoned him for a specified period of time.: -'
New York expressly provides that a wife's abandonment that would be
sufficient to obtain a judgment of separation will bar the widow's
claim. 3 3 The three-year separation which will bar widows' claims in
Texas has been said to have been drawn from the divorce statutes."
These provisions intertwine fault and nondependency. Other grounds
for divorce, such as adultery, however, do not bar the legal wife's
claim. Thus the statutory rules making abandonment or separation a
bar to claims must be interpreted as a recognition of the absence of
actual dependency, rather than an incorporation of the fault concepts
of divorce law into workmen's compensation.
2. Co177on Law Wives.-ln states which recognize common
law marriages, however reluctantly, the common law wife is entitled to
death benefits under workmen's compensation.35 Indiana limits this
doctrine by excluding a common law wife from eligibility for death
benefits 4nless the relationship existed openly and notoriously for not
less than five years immediately preceeding the workman's death.:
In states which do not recognize common law marriages, 7 the
woman claiming dependency as a common law wife is denied death
benefits. This exclusion is a sanction of domestic relations law and it
is an arbitrary sanction in that a woman whose common law husband
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 360) (1964 Replacement Vol.) (one-year desertion bars
claim); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (1967) (three-year separation).
33. N.Y. WORKMEN'S Co.%ip. LAW § 16 (McKinney 1965).
34. Doty v. Travelers Ins. Co., 31 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Tex. 1940).
35. Shelton v. Belknap, 155 Tex. 37, 282 S.W.2d 682 (1955).
36. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4 0-1403a (1965). The Indiana statute further requires that the
relationships have been entered into before January 1, 1958. See Comment, The (Colunion Law
Wife and Workmen's Compensation, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 79 (1959).
37. Tennessee is said to have abrogated the common law in relation to marriage in 1858.
See Crawford v. Crawford, 198 Tenn. 9, 277 S.W.2d 389 (1955).
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happens to be the victim of an industrial accident is excluded from
death benefits to replace the support she formerly received while
another women, who maintains a similar common law marriage and
whose mate is fortunate enough to avoid accidental death, does not
bear the hardship of this sanction.
The strongest argument against providing death benefits to the
common law wife in those states which do not recognize the
relationship is that the "marriage" can be terminated at any time. The
spouse, therefore, cannot reasonably expect to benefit from the future
earnings of the workman. The Indiana statute provides a partial answer
to this challenge by providing a.time test of five years, assuming that
a relationship which continues that long is very likely to continue
indefinitely. This principle should be carried further, however, to be
fully effective. Other factors, such as the fact that the woman bears
children by the workman, should be considered in determining whether
a shorter period of time than five years would entitle the woman to
3
receive death benefits. 1
3. Non-legal Relationships.-One of the fundamental principles
of compensation law is that the claimant's fault or misconduct does
not normally affect his rights to benefits. Applied to dependency, this
would mean that proof of actual dependency would not be defeated by
proof of the immoral character of the relationship out of which the
dependency grew. 3 Thus, a test that looks to actual and expected
dependency to determine whether it is likely that support would have
continued if the deceased workman had lived should not be modified
for moral considerations. Even in the truly meretricious relationship,
benefits should be awarded if no other parties are involved and the
relationship has lasted long enough to indicate the likelihood that it will
continue indefinitely.
In practice, the good faith of a claimant may play a role in
determining whether she is entitled to benefits as a widow. Thus, even
though her marriage is illegal, the claimant may be allowed
compensation benefits if she entered into the relationship innocently
and in good faith, but will be denied benefits if she knew that she had
engaged in a meretricious relationship." Where the legal wife and the
38. The mother of an illegitimate would be entitled to receive benefits for the child (see note
42 infra) and should receive benefits for herself if actually dependent.
39. See2 A. LARSON, supra note 7, § 63.41.
40.. Compare Eason v. Alexander Shipyards, Inc., 47 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 1950), and Perry
v. Sun Coal Co., 183 Tenn. 141, 191 S.W.2d 181 (1945), with McDonald v. Kelly Coal Co., 335
Mich. 325, 55 N.W.2d 851 (1952), and Fields v. Hollowell & Hollowell, 238 N.C. 614, 78 S.E.2d
740 (1953).
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good faith wife both claim dependency under a statute requiring
recognition of the legal wife, the best approach would reject an all-ornothing solution and divide the death benefits between both claimants.
Thus, in one reported case, the decedent abandoned his first wife, and,
without obtaining a divorce, "remarried" another woman who had no
reason to suspect the continuing validity of the prior marriage. By
splitting the death benefits, the court recognized both
dependencies-one the decedent actually supported and the other he
was obligated to support.4
As noted previously, the greatest hardship is experienced by the
woman widowed at about age 42. At this age, even if not legally
married, the woman is likely to have lived with her husband many
years, and an appropriate remedy ought to be fashioned to reach these
cases of greatest hardship without providing undeserved benefits. This
could possibly be accomplished by limiting the period for which the
non-legal wife would be entitled to death benefits to a period equal to
the length of time of open cohabitation. Providing further, that if such
a period did not exceed a specified minimum, perhaps five years, all
benefits would be denied. Such a test would look to actual dependency,
rather than moral judgments.
IV.

OTHER DEPENDENCY PROBLEMS

A.

Legitimacy

Under statutes granting presumptions of dependency to children of
a deceased worker, a question arises whether illegitimate children are
included within the term "children." On the one hand, it could be
argued that the illegitimate child is similar to the non-legal wife, and
should be excluded for the protection of the legal family. This
reasoning would require exclusion of the claims of dependent
illegitimates only when there is a legitimate child or legal wife to be
protected. On the other hand, if the exclusion of the non-legal wife were
based on a notion of moral blameworthiness, rather than on the
concept of protection of the legal wife, the analogy could not apply to
an illegitimate child, who must be considered blameless. Thus, the
illegitimate child could fare better than the non-legal wife, and might
claim the right to share benefits with legitimates, as well as to be
entitled when no legitimates exist.42
41. Ritchie v. Katy Coal Co., 313 Ky. 310, 231 S.W.2d 57 (1950).
42. See Caddo Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So. 2d 177 (1953) (covered
illegitimate children, as well as legitimate children, the mother of the illegitimates asserting only

their rights, not her own).
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It should be noted that separate classifications of legitimates and
illegitimates may violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
43 the Supreme Court considered a
amendment. In Levy v. Louisiana,
state wrongful death statute that limited offspring capable of suing
under the statute to those who are legitimate. In reversing the dismissal
of an action for wrongful death brought by the decedent's five
illegitimate children, the Court held that the statute worked an
invidious discrimination against illegitimate children and contravened
the fourteenth amendment, since legitimacy and illegitimacy of birth
had no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the
deceased. It is quite possible that the logic of this holding would be
extended to strike down separaie classifications for legitimate and
illegitimate children in workmen's compensation.4
It is doubtful that the test of actual dependency for eligibility
should be used for both the non-legal wife and the illegitimate child.
The non-legal wife, who has a degree of control over the relationship
between lerself and the decedent, is probablt treated fairly when
entitled to benefits according to her actual dependency. A statute that
determines the rights of children according to actual dependency,
however, might in fact discriminate against illegitimates who do not
live with the worker. Even though an obligation exists in almost every
state to support illegitimates who live apart from the worker,45 such
support may not be provided. No inference adverse to the illegitimate
should be drawn from the failure to enforce the parents' obligations
because the enforcement of such rights is beyond the control of the
child. It could be suggested that both actual dependency and legal
obligation are appropriate standards for determining eligibility of
children. Any presumption of dependency should apply to all children,
illegitimate as well as legitimate.
B.

Adopted Children and Stepchildren

It is easier to fit a legally adopted child into the scheme of rights
fixed for the natural children of a workman who adopts the child than
it is to determine the appropriate rule for a worker's stepchildren.
43. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
44. The treatment accorded illegitimates in all states is covered in Davis, The Illegitimate
Child, Workmen's Compensation section of volume 33 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, to be published in the fall
of 1969.
45. The virtual unanimity of all states in providing such an obligation is discussed in
Karuse, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Soiet.t-A Proposed Uniforn Act on Legitinac.l,

44 TEXAS L. REv. 829, 848 (1966).
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Generally, stepchildren will not be entitled to benefits on stepparent's
death unless this is expressly provided by statute. 6 The marriage of the
stepparent to the natural parent of the stepchild creates a two-link
relationship between stepchild and stepparent. If the stepchild were
living with the stepparent and were dependent upon him, the
relationship would be quite similar to an adoption of the child. The
relationship is easily distinguished, however, from a legal adoption in
that the stepchild may be able to look to another parent, not the
stepparent, for financial support. The adopted child, however, would be
unable to expect support from his natural parents.
The basic problem in providing benefits for a workman's
stepchildren or adopted children is the possibility that such children
may be entitled to benefits if the child's natural parent suffered an
occupational death." In the case of stepchildren, the mere possibility
of double dependency should not be a valid reason to deny death
benefits where the stepchild was actually dependent upon the
stepparent. Thus the test of dependency in fact could eliminate double
dependency for stepchildren.
Under the better view, there is no possibility of double dependency
for adopted children, since that view maintains that a child adopted by
another is not entitled to benefits on the death of its natural parent."
Some states, however, do permit an adopted child to participate in
death benefits on the occupational death of a natural parent,
analogizing compensation rights to the child's right to inherit from its
natural parent. 9 Compensation benefits, however, should replace the
support a workman gave and could be expected to give, and the natural
parent would be unlikely to give such support when there is no
obligation. The possibility that a child adopted by another might
inherit on the natural parent's death if the parent's earnings were
accumulated and then distributed intestate or by will to the child is far
too tenuous to provide a satisfactory basis for the analogy.
46. E.g.. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 562 (Supp. 1969).
47. See Day v. Town Club, 241 Iowa 264, 45 N.W.2d 222 (1950) (possible double
dependency of stepchild).
48. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clem, 288 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Tex. 1968); New Amsterdam
Cas. Co. v. Freeland, 216 Ga. 491, 117 S.E.2d 538 (1960). See' also Alexander v. Employers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 102 Ga. App. 750, 118 S.E.2d 215 (1960); Patton v. Shamburger, 431 S.W.2d
506 (Tex. 1968), noted in 22 Sw. L.J. 699 (1968).
49. Holland Constr. Co. v. Sullivan, 220 Ark. 895, 251 S.W.2d 120 (1952); Wilson v. Hill,
6 Terry 251, 71 A.2d 425 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950); Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
70 Colo. 229, 199 P. 483 (1921); Snook v. Herrmann, 161 N.W.2d 185 (Iowa 1968); Shulman v.
Board of Fire Underwriters, 15 App. Div. 2d 700, 223 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1962).
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A child's adoption after the natural parent's death has been held
not to terminate his rights to death benefits. 5 " This result can be
justified because it encourages the adoption of the orphaned child. On
the other hand, the marriage of a child might well be considered an
event which terminates the dependency.,' The latter conclusion is
probably based more on the policy of discouraging early marriage,
however, than it is an appraisal of what the parent would have done
had he not suffered an occupational death. Finally, a child in an
orphanage, or penal institution, would probably not be entitled to
benefits, except where the institution would have been entitled to
52
recover support payments from the parent were he living.
C.

Prioritv A niong Dependents

Competition among survivors raises the difficult question of
priority. Most statutes give the surviving spouse and children priority
over other dependents. The inadequacy of overall available benefits
probably dictates the exclusion of some dependents, even though they
have expectations of support, in order to give maximum benefits to
those most closely related to the decedent. Such reasoning may require
the exclusion of the divorced wife in order to give the wife married to
the worker at the time of death more adequate benefits, or the exclusion
of partially dependent parents in order more fully to provide for the
widow and children. Convenience of administration might also be cited
to justify the exclusion of partial or more remote dependents in favor
of the surviving spouse or children. But such a compromise is
unprincipled. Apportioning benefits in a manner similar to the way the
decedent divided his earnings would not be especially difficult to
administer. It would fit the expectations of the affected parties. If
benefits are inadequate, that problem should affect all dependents
equally.
D.

.-l bsence of Dependeits and Alien Dependents

When there is no dependent entitled to benefits, statutes often
require that some amount be paid into a fund, such as the second injury
fund, designated for the occasion.-- Such a provision brings home to
the employer, and to those responsible for employment safety, the fact
50.

51.
52.
53.

ht re Jones, 84 Idaho 327, 372 P.2d 406 (1962).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1315(d) (1947).
Harve De Grace Fireworks Co. v. Howe, 206 Md. 158, 110 A.2d 666 (1955).
Eg.. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 288(2) (1958).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

of an employment death, and may serve to increase employment
safety."
Death benefits may not be awarded, under some statutes, if the
dependent involved is an alien,5 5 although treaties may avoid the
implementation of this restriction. Such limitations run contrary to
the purpose of replacing the support that was afforded by the worker
during his lifetime, except when such benefits would fall into the hands
of an alien property custodian or otherwise be denied to the
dependent. 56 Furthermore, a number of treaties regulate the
implementation of this restriction on aliens.57 Nevertheless, if benefits
otherwise payable are reduced or denied because the beneficiaries are
aliens, the policy of making the costs of employment death felt by those
responsible for employment safety requires that such unawarded funds
be applied to a second injury fund or otherwise used for compensation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of death benefits under compensation'law should be
to replace support that the deceased workman provided others during
his lifetime. Support should be provided for all survivors who might
reasonably have expected to receive support had the workman not
suffered an accidental death. Fault oriented rules should not be
borrowed from domestic relations law. Neither should statutes try to
provide for the exclusion of those actually supported by the decedent
such as stepparents and brothers and sisters of the half blood." In
order to authorize those who administer compensation benefits to see
that death benefits take the place of actual support, statutes should
provide simply for the payment of death benefits to "dependents."
If notions of morality require the exclusion of the non-legal wife
whose relationship is merely meretricious, a time limitation could be
used to exclude the truly meretricious relationship and still entitle the
54.

Calabresi, Does the Fault SYsten OptiniallY Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAW
429 (1968).
55. 3 A. LARSON. supra note 7, table 17, at 552.
56. The treaties between the United States and other countries which contain provisions
relating to workmen's compensation are collected in the Digests of Laws, published by the
Workmen's Compensation Board, State of New York, at 87 (1969 rev. ed.).
57. The most sensible provision is one such as is found in New York which provides that
when a nonresident would not have full control of the benefit payment, the benefits shall be paid
to the comptroller; and whenever the conditions which limit the beneficiary's right to control
payments have been removed, payment will be made to the beneficiary.
58. Cf Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Stanaland, 189 S.W.2d 55, alld, 145 Tex. 105. 195
S.W.2d 118 (1946) (half-brother included); Southern Surety Co. v. Weaver, 273 S.W. 838 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1925) (stepmother excluded).
& CONTEMP. PROB.
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non-legal wife to benefits when long cohabitation or other factors make
some expectations of the future support reasonable. The divorced
spouse, of course, should always share in any benefits available as a
dependent whenever she has or could have obtained a court order for
her support.
Although equal treatment of widow and widower is best achieved
by eliminating any presumption of dependency, special provisions for
children seem appropriate. No child has the power to compel a parent
to regularize the parent's relationship, or to enforce the parent's
obligation of support. Neither should a child be compelled to prove
that the parent had met the parent's general obligations of support. If
the term "child" is defined to include the stepchildren, the adopted
child, the illegitimate, and all posthumous children both legal and
illegitimate, all such children should be entitled to a presumption of
dependency. The possibility of double dependency for stepchildren and
adopted children should be met by including the stepchild so long as
double dependency is only a possibility, and excluding the child
adopted by another before the death of its natural parent.

